Eric
Gartman /
Salaries
& Business
It is every fan’s dream to be the General Manager of a baseball team. Just look at the popularity of fantasy leagues. But valuing a free-agent player in the real world is no easy task. How can a GM predict the future production of a player? There are certain rules which should serve as guidelines for any GM looking at a prospective player. First is age: An average player will be in prime from about age 25-32. Afterwards, his productivity will drop off rapidly. Above-average players will be in their prime during these years, and still may produce for a couple of years afterwards. Superstars, however, can be productive well into their late thirties. Also important is not just quality during these peak year, but at what age a hitter started in the majors. A hitter who is putting up good numbers before age 25 will probably continue to do so past age 32. But beware hitters who start at age 25: Once past 32, they are a dangerous gamble. It is also important to note a hitters plate discipline. The number of walks vs. strikeouts is important at all stages of a hitter’s career. Free swingers with few walks don’t last as long as guys who take as many walks as whiffs.
Predicting pitching is harder since pitchers often bloom late in the their careers. Furthermore, early bloomers tend to have arm trouble and often burnout early, like Dwight Gooden and Steve Avery. Injuries are of course the wild card. It is hard to predict who will get injured, but injury-prone players tend to stay that way throughout their careers. This applies to both hitters and pitchers. I have used Bill James win shares system as the basis for most of my statistics. I believe it is the single best stat ever created. According to James, players with over 30 win shares in a season are MVP candidates, 20-30 are all-star players, 10-20 are solid regulars, and 0-10 bench players. Let us now turn to real-life examples.
Superstars: The Prime Years
Some free-agent signings are no-brainers. The very best players in
the game are worth paying top money, especially in their
prime. In 1992, Barry Bonds
became the highest paid player in the game, with a contract averaging $7.3
million over six years for the San Francisco
Giants. Bonds became a full-time
major leaguer at the tender of age of 21, when he registered 15 win shared
for the 1986 Pirates, very impressive for player that age. Bonds continued
to improve steadily over the next few years, and blossomed into a full-blown
star in 1990, when at age 25 he won the MVP honors with 37 win shares. He
was just as good over the next two years, with win shares of 37 and 41, good
enough for another MVP in 1992.
Predicting his future performance when he became a free agent after
the ’92 season, I have would bet on another 4 years at the superstar
level, followed by another three seasons at a very high level into his
mid-thirties. The six-year deal
the Giants signed him to was a fairly safe
bet. Bonds had come up early,
and had peaked at a very high level. He was still in his prime at age 28,
and was worth being the best paid player in the
game.
In his next six years with the Giants, Bonds did not
disappoint. He led the league
in homers and RBI’s in 1993, winning his third MVP, and taking an
astonishing 47 win shares. In
the seasons that followed he registered win share totals of 25 (in the
strike-shortened ’94 season), 36,39,36 and 34. He was the best player
in the league once during this period, second-best three times, and third
best once. It’s hard to argue with those kind of numbers. Signing Barry
Bonds in his prime can hardly be considered a huge risk, and the players
that followed him as the highest paid in the years that followed also were
not much of a gamble. Ken Griffey
(1996), Greg Maddux (1997), and Pedro Martinez (1997) all signed contracts
in the years that followed that made them the highest paid players in the
game, and all were worth the money.
After acquiring Shawn Green from the Blue Jays in very one-sided deal,
the Dodgers signed him to six-year $84 million contract in November 1999.
Since Green was only 27, and therefore still in his prime, six years wasn’t
too long, as he would still be 32 at the end of the deal. Green came to the
majors at age 22 in 1995, when he posted 10 win shares. Green burst out in
1998, with 21 win shares, and followed with 24 the next year. He was a bust
in the first year of his deal with the Dodgers, posting only 22 win shares,
but he followed with 34 in 2001, and 30 in 2002. Green was only 30 years
old going into 2003, and expect two or three more years from him at around
30 win shares, before a slight decline. But since he is not being paid as
much as some of the other stars in the game, I think it’s a good deal
for the Dodgers.
Another huge contract was given to Manny Ramirez in December 2000.
The Red Sox signed Manny to an eight-year $160 million contract. Ramirez
would be 29 in 2001, and hence 36 in the final year of his deal. Manny was
a full-time regular with Cleveland in Indians at age 22, and at age 23 already
posted 25 win shares. He continued to play at that level over the next few
years, peaking in 1999 with 165 RBI’s and 35 win shares. Injuries limited
him to 118 games the next year, but he still posted 27 win shares with a
.351 batting average and 122 RBI’s. At the time of his new contract,
I would have predicted another four or five years at 25-30 win shares, followed
by solid, if unspectacular production in his mid-thirties through the end
of his contract. Manny registered 25 win shares in 2001, although he missed
some games due to injuries, and posted 29 in
2002. He is a solid player,
but I’m not sure if he will be worth $20 million a year in the last
few years of his contract.
Three days before Manny signed his deal, the Texas Rangers signed
Alex Rodriguez to a whopping 10-year $252 million
contract. The deal raised eyebrows
around baseball, and rightly so. A-Rod may be the best offensive shortstop
in baseball history, and he was only 25 years old at the time, but no player
was even earning $20 million a year. In fact, the closest was Kevin Brown
at $15 million a year.
Furthermore, the Rangers had considerable leverage, as they were the
only interested team. They could
have easily signed him for about $20 million a year, which would have left
more room for the pitching they so desperately needed.
There wasn’t really any doubt that Rodriguez was a great
player, nor that he would be
in ten years time. A-Rod tore
up the minors at every level he played at, and as a 21-year old major leaguer
with the Seattle Mariners in 1996 he led the league in runs, doubles, and
batting average, for a league-best 34 win shares. He slipped a bit with 22
win shares in 1997, but was back up to 30 in 1998. Injuries limited him to
23 in 1999, but he posted 37 in 2000, the last year before his free agency.
In his first year in Texas, A-Rod posted 37 win shares, but with no pitching,
the Rangers languished in last place.
The exact same scenario played out in 2002, with A-Rod pacing the
AL with 35 win shares, but with the pitching-poor Rangers again finishing
in last place. For the rare player of his caliber, it’s reasonable to
expect greatness into his mid-thirties, albeit at a level not quite as a
high as in his prime. A-Rod
might not be scoring 37 win shares in the final years of his contract, but
30 are not out of the question for him.
And of course, there are also times when the best players in their
prime don’t live up to
expectations. In 2000 the Cincinnati
Reds signed Ken Griffey, Jr. to a 9-year, $116 million
contract. Since he was only
thirty years old and still in his prime, it was a good
gamble. In the three previous
years Griffey had registered 36, 29, and 31 win
shares. He had come up to the
majors at age 19, and as early as age 21 had registered 30 win shares. Going
into the 2000 season Griffey seemed like a sure-fire hall of famer, the kind
of player who is good until his late 30’s. If I were to predict his
performance in 2000, I would give him two or three more years at around 30
win shares, followed by several more good years at around 25 win shares,
before falling to around 20 win shares at around age
37.
But it was not to be. In
2000, Griffey posted 24 win shares, not bad, but well below the 30 most baseball
people expected. Still, Griffey
was supposed to rebound in 2001.
Injuries limited him to 111 games, but he was not especially productive
during those games, batting .286 with 22
homers. Injuries continued to
hound Griffey in 2002, and early in 2003 he was injured
again. The case of Junior Griffey
proves that is essentially impossible to predict performance with 100 percent
accuracy. If there was ever
a sure thing in baseball before 2000, he was
it. His future is clouded, and
due to his injuries, it is even harder to predict how he will do
now.
Another case of a superstar player falling below expectations came
with the Orioles signing of White Sox slugger Albert Belle in December 1998
to a five-year $65 million contract.
Following a monster 1998 season in which bashed 152 RBI’s for
a total of 37 win shares, the Orioles, in desperate need of a big slugger
to make up for the loss of Rafael Palmeiro, rolled the dice on
Belle. His 37 homers and 117
RBI’s in 1999 were well short of the 50 home runs that were expected
of him. He registered 24 win
shares, not bad, but less than hoped
for. Belle was hitting well
in 2000 when a hip problem brought his numbers
down. He finally sat out, and
then never came back. A degenerative
hip kept him from playing again.
Belle’s injury makes many view his signing as a disaster, but
there was no way to predict that.
Belle had never been prone to injury before, and had he stayed healthy,
he might have put up solid, if unspectacular numbers for a few more
years. Belle was a late bloomer
who didn’t have his first monster year until age 27. But beginning at
age 27, he put up win share totals of 27, 24, 30, 31, 18, and 37. Expecting
him to reach 37 win shares again after age 32 was clearly unrealistic, but
he might have been able to match the 24 win shares registered in 1999 for
another two or three years, and then settled at around 20 for the remainder
of his contract. With Belle
in the middle of lineup BJ Surhoff and Harold Baines had huge seasons, making
Belle more valuable than the 24 win shares he totaled that
year. Most people say the deal
was a bust, but I’m not sure it was such a bad
gamble. Besides, the Orioles
insurance paid most of the remainder of Belle’s contract.
And occasionally a player who is not anywhere close to being the best
player in baseball gets paid the highest
salary. It happened in December
1991 when the Mets made Bobby Bonilla the highest paid player in baseball
with a contract averaging $5.8 million a year for five
years. Most likely, the Mets
were fooled by Bonilla’s monster year in 1991, when he had 31 win
shares. But that was with Barry
Bonds and Andy Van Slyke in the lineup, and Bonilla had no track record of
producing at anywhere near that level. The year before Bonilla only had 23
win shares. He would be 29 years
old in 1992, and unlikely to improve.
Furthermore, he never had a particularly good work ethic or
attitude. In 1992 I would have predicted Bonilla to average around
25 win shares over the next 4 years, before slipping in his fifth
season. What did Bonilla do?
He was actually even worse than that, posting win shares of 18,16,19 over
the next three years. The Mets, eager to offload Bonilla and his salary,
finally found a taker (sucker?) with the Orioles in mid-1995, where Bonilla
finished out his contract in 1996. He wasn’t much better his last two
years, with win share totals of 22 and
19. Bonilla stuck around for
a few more years afterwards, never coming close to repeating his career year
of 1991. Incidentally, the Pirates
made a similar mistake the next season.
Forced to choose between keeping Van Slyke or Bonds, they kept Van
Slyke, whose numbers eroded quickly without Bonds in the
lineup. All along, it was Bonds
who was the driving force of the Pirate teams of the early
90’s.
Another team who made the mistake of giving an above-average player
with one monster year superstar-type money was the Toronto Blue Jays with
Carlos Delgado. Delgado’s first year with the Blue Jays was at age 24,
and he improved steadily over the next few years, posting win shares of 18,24,21,
before breaking out in 2000 with a tremendous 36 win shares. The Blue Jays
were mightily impressed, and signed him to a long-term deal for top money.
But the Jays should have been more
careful. Delgado was 28 when
he finally had his huge season, and based on his previous numbers and arrival
in the majors at age 24, he was not likely to repeat that performance. In
2001 he only posted 23 win shares, and in 2002 he registered 26. Like Bonilla
and the Mets, the Jays let one huge season fool
them.
And in the opposite direction, occasionally there are great player
in their prime who do not get the money they deserve. In November 1998, second
baseman Roberto Alomar signed a 4-year, $30 million contract with the Cleveland
Indians, with a fifth year, $8 option. Alomar was worth a lot more money
than that, however. After tearing up the minors as a teenage, Alomar made
his major league debut as at age 20 with the San Diego Padres in 1988. He
posted 22 win shares, showing a high average, good speed on the basepaths,
and stellar defense. Alomar continued to improve, having his first huge season
for the Toronto Blue Jays in 1992 at age 24 with 34 win shares, and followed
with 30 the next year. He
wasn’t quite as good in 1994 and 1995, as he was hampered by injuries
and did not have the same protection in the lineup, but he still posted fine
numbers. The Orioles signed him to a three-year deal in 1996, and he immediately
responded with a huge year, scoring 132 runs and posting 31 win
shares. Despite playing in only
112 games in 1997, he batted .333 and gained 21 win shares. 1997 was also
the first year since 1990 that Alomar did not win the gold glove for his
stellar play in the field.
But Alomar seemed to fade in 1998, batting only .282 with 19 win shares
in a full season. Later it was revealed that the Alomar was upset with the
Orioles, and did not play his hardest in the second half of the season. Perhaps
this is why he was so undervalued that
offseason. Some said that he
was now on the downside of his career, and now that he was 31 his skills
would fade quickly due to his lack of fitness training. But people should
have known better, even if they did not know why Alomar played so poorly
in 1998. Alomar not only came up at a very early age and played well, he
also peaked high, posting over 30 win shares three
times. At age 31, he was still
in his prime, and it should have been clear that he would continue to produce
into his mid-thirties, and probably later than that, albeit at a lower level.
The Indians contract with him at a little over $7 million a year was a steal
(Mike Piazza signed a deal worth $13 million a year the same month). Some
folks were surprised by Robbie’s huge year in 1999 when he led the league
in runs scored, as well as showed power by hitting 24 homers and driving
120 while stealing 37 bases, for 35 win shares, tied for best in the league.
He also won his second consecutive gold
glove. But they shouldn’t
have been. Certainly his huge offensive numbers where helped by the awesome
Cleveland lineup, but he was a big part of it. Robbie didn’t quite match
those numbers in 2000, with a solid 20 win shares, but was stellar again
in 2001, batting .336 and driving in 100 runs, for a personal high of 37
win shares.
The cash-strapped Indians dealt him to the Mets before the 2002 season,
were he batted only .266 and posted a very disappointing 16 win shares that
season. Nonetheless, the Mets exercised his 2003 option, and for a mere $8
million, they should have. So
how will Alomar fare in the last year of his deal? In 2003, Robbie will be
35 years old, and coming off a rather mediocre year. But he had no protection
in weak lineup in 2002. Alomar had had some off years in the past, and rebounded
quite well. I would expect him to easily top his 16 win shares from last
season, because players don’t drop off from such high points so quickly.
Alomar is a first-ballot hall of famer, the kind of player who is good into
his late thirties. He may be back in 2003, but his superstar days are probably
over.
And what of Mike Piazza and his $13 million a year? The Mets signed
him to a 7-year $81 million deal in November, 1998. Piazza came up as a catcher
with the Los Angeles Dodgers at age 24 in 1993, and won Rookie of the Year,
with an impressive 32 win shares. He continued to play well, batting for
both power and average in the years that followed. He posted 33 win shares
in 1996, and reached his peak in 1997, batting .362 with 40 homers, for 39
win shares. But Piazza and the Dodgers could not agree on a contract in 1998,
and he was shipped of to Florida, and then New York. Despite all the moving,
he caught fire in with the Mets, and posted a total of 33 win shares for
1998. Piazza would be thirty years old in 1999, he was already the best hitting
catcher in major league history. He had posted win share totals of 33, 39,
and 33 in the previous three seasons. He was very strong and in excellent
shape.
But Piazza also played the most demanding position in baseball, a
place where most players don’t last very long, as the constant squatting
takes its toll. If Piazza played any other position I would not have blinked
at signing him to a lucrative six or seven year deal, but the fact that he
was a catcher should have made the Mets pause. Catchers past thirty don’t
tend to catch much longer. Maybe the Mets thought they could move him to
another position, like first base, where he could extend his career. Piazza
had always been a very mediocre catcher at best anyway. The Mets ended up
giving Piazza seven years and $81, a little too long in my opinion, unless
they planned on moving him from catcher.
Piazza hit 40 homers in 1999, but his average dropped to .303, his
lowest in the majors, for a total of 21 win shares. Piazza had a big season
in 2000, batting .324 for 29 win shares, but he faded towards the end of
the season. A weak Mets lineup in 2001 left him under 100 RBI’s, despite
his 36 homers, for 21 win shares. Things were even worse in 2002, when the
Mets efforts to give him help in the lineup failed, and Piazza posted only
19 win shares. Piazza’s
defense has also declined, as opposing runners steal bases on him seemingly
at will. Piazza’s numbers haven’t been bad, but they aren’t
quite worth they money. The Mets will get only declining numbers from him
so long as they keep at catcher.
It is of course harder to predict how a superstar will perform when
he is past his prime years of 25-32.
After the 1996 season, Roger Clemens demanded top money from Boston
Red Sox, who weren’t sure whether he was worth
it. Clemens was 34 years old,
and had gone 39-40 over the last four years, hardly Cy Young
material. The Red Sox let him
go, and the Toronto Blue Jays decided to take a chance on him for three years
and $21 million, which at $7 million a year was far less than the $11 million
Greg Maddux received that offseason.
Clemens went on to win the Cy Young award the next two seasons for
the Jays, before being traded to the Yankees for the 1999 season, where he
struggled a bit. Still, it was
one of the greatest deals in history.
But could the Sox have known Clemens would return to form? Actually,
yes. Clemens was great from
a young age, winning at every level in the minors, before doing well in the
majors at the young age of 22. He won the Cy Young at age 24, and continued
to the best pitcher in the AL
afterwards. Clemens posted stellar
seasons in 1991 and ’92, but
faltered in ’93 going 11-14 with a mediocre 4.46
ERA. But in the strike shortened
’94 season his 9-7 record did not accurately reflect his stingy 2.87
ERA. The win shares system rates
him as the third-best pitcher in the AL that year. The next year he was 10-5
with a 4.18 ERA, not bad, but hardly worth top
dollar. But the Red Sox may
have undervalued Clemens mostly due to his 1996
campaign. Clemens pitched 242
innings, posting a 3.63 era, excellent numbers, but poor run support left
him with a 10-13 record. But
despite the won-lost record, win shares sees him as the fourth-best pitcher
in the AL that year, with 20 win shares. All in all, the Red Sox could have
predicted solid, if not quite Cy Young results from the Rocket for the next
few years. Clemens further helped himself by committing to a rigorous workout
regiment as he approached his mid-thirties, a necessity for an older athlete
who wishes to stay competitive.
Clemens clearly exceeded expectations, but those expectations should
have been fairly high. The Red Sox may have lost out on Clemens, but they
did well by signing another superstar, Pedro Martinez the following year,
to a contract averaging $12.5 million annually.
Another 34-year old pitcher was signed two years later, when the Los
Angeles Dodgers shocked the baseball world in December 1998 by signing Kevin
Brown to a seven-year, $105 million
contract. It was the most lucrative
deal in baseball history, exceeding Mike Piazza’s $13 million annual
contract. There wasn’t
any doubt that Brown was a great pitcher, but would he be at age
40? In his earlier years, Brown
was a solid pitcher, who didn’t live up to his potential as a great
pitcher until age 31, when he posted a phenomenal 1.86 ERA with the Marlins
in 1996. He was great in again 1997, and in 1998 he helped pitched the Padres
to the World Series, where he gained national attention for his heroics during
the playoffs. The Dodgers needed
an ace, and had the money to spend.
Brown, a very talented power pitcher, might have been expected to
be a late bloomer who stayed good late, like Nolan Ryan or Warren
Spahn. It could therefore be
seen as a reasonable risk, especially if you have the money, like the Dodgers
did.
In his first year, Brown anchored the staff and won 18 games, just
what the Dodgers wanted. He
registered 19 win shares, and was the fifth-best pitcher in the NL. In 2000,
Brown was slightly better, leading the league in ERA and registering 20 win
shares, fourth-best in the NL. So
far, so good. But injuries limited
Brown to 115 innings in 2001. Although he was effective when he pitched,
he only registered 11 win shares. Injuries further limited Brown in 2002,
but this time when he pitched he was
ineffective. Brown still has
three more years on his contract, but I would say that unless he is stellar
in all three seasons, the deal was more or less a
bust. Had I been predicting Brown’s performance in 1998,
I would expect another two or three years of stellar pitching, another two
years of above average pitching, and maybe two years of very average
results. All in all, too much
of a risk for seven years.
The problem wasn’t the money, however, as much as the duration
of the deal. The Dodgers had
money to burn, and $15 million may not be too much for an
ace. If I were the Dodgers I
would have agreed to no more than a four-year deal with a fifth year
option. Had Brown proved effective
for six or seven years, that would be a tolerable risk: The Dodgers could
have resigned him to a new contract, just like the Diamondbacks did with
Randy Johnson after his option year in
2002. But tough-talking agent
Scott Boras suckered the Dodgers into a long deal, much like he did with
Texas and Alex Rodriguez.
It’s not over for Brown yet, but I would be very surprised if
he is able to make the deal worthwhile for the
Dodgers.
Another older pitcher was signed that same offseason, Randy
Johnson. Johnson was a year
older than Brown, and the Arizona Diamondbacks offered him a four-year deal
at $12.35 million a year, with a fourth-year $15 million
option. Like the Brown deal,
the Johnson signing was questioned.
Not only would Johnson be 38 by the time the contract was up, but
he had pitched poorly for the Mariners during the first half of 1998, before
coming to the Astros and posting gaudy
numbers.
The rest, of course, is history.
Johnson won the Cy Young award in each of his first four years of
the deal, pitching better than he had at any other time in his career, and
absolutely dominating National League
hitters. The Diamondbacks then
happily picked up his option for 2003.
It was one of the greatest free agent signings in
history. But could the same
be expected of Brown? First, it should be noted that there was really no
way to have expected Johnson’s
performance. Certainly he was
a great pitcher beforehand, but he actually improved after age 35, and continued
to stay at that level. Lefthanders and power pitchers tend to peak late, and
Johnson was both. That, along
with his massive height, which required time to learn how to control, are
the reasons for the Big Unit’s late
arrival. But there was really
no way to have known ahead of time just how good his numbers would
be.
The Diamondbacks took the right strategy with a fairly
short contract and an option year as the way to manage the risk of signing
an older player.
So what can we expect now from
Johnson? Well, clearly Johnson
is in uncharted territory. There
have only been a few pitchers who were effective so late in their careers.
One of the most similar was Warren Spahn, another left-handed power pitcher
who developed fairly late. Spahn missed the early years of his career due
to World War Two, and did not pitch his first full season until he was 26.
He was great from that point on, and maintained his consistency until very
late, amassing 363 wins. He had his last great season at age 42 when he won
23 games and led the league in complete
games. He collapsed quickly
afterwards, however, and was ineffective and injured at age 43 before rebounding
with decent numbers at age 44 and finally
retiring. Another pitcher who
maintained effectiveness late in his career was the ageless one, Nolan Ryan.
The Texas Rangers signed the 42-year old Ryan in 1989 and he responded with
three good years in which he posted win shares totals of 18,15, and 13 at
ages 42-44. Another example is Phil Niekro who posted 24 win shares at age
40, and had several more good years after that. Niekro was a knuckleballer,
however, and knuckleballers often last a long time, ie. Charlie Hough.
Other than these three there aren’t really any pitchers who have
made it as long as the Big Unit (unless we look at Cy Young who pitched over
100 years ago). I don’t
feel that Niekro is even comparable since he was a knuckleball pitcher. That
leaves two previous example, Ryan and Spahn. Of the two, I’d say Johnson
is closer to Spahn, in that he was a late-blooming, power-pitching
lefty. Johnson is 39 in 2003,
and will turn 40 halfway through the season. I think its possible that he
can have another three good years, although not quite at the Cy Young level
that he has been at. The Diamondbacks played it safe, signing Johnson to
another two years, but at the handsome price of $33
million. I think the Diamondbacks
will get two good years out of Johnson, although injuries are the wild card.
Players tend to become more injury-prone as they age, and the Unit finally
went down early in 2003. But he will be back, and the Diamondbacks probably
will get their money’s
worth.
The same offseason that Brown and Johnson were signed as free agents,
there were also two slugging first basemen who were looking for new teams:
Mo Vaughn and Rafael Palmeiro.
Both had put up nearly identical numbers in 1998; Vaughn registered
25 win shares to Palmeiro’s 24. But Vaughn was 31 years old and Palmeiro
was 34. Shouldn’t teams have concluded that Vaughn would
produce better numbers in the future? Actually, close examination would have
predicted Palmeiro to be better bet than
Vaughn. A good hitter before
age 25 will continue to hit well past age 32, but a good hitter who comes
into his prime at age 25 is a big risk in his
mid-thirties. This explains
the different career paths for Palmeiro and
Vaughn. Rafael Palmeiro played his first full season with Cubs
at age 23, posting a high average, lots of doubles, and good plate discipline,
striking out only 34 times versus 38
walks. The only missing element
was home run power. But power
is usually the last skill a hitter develops, and Palmeiro’s high number
of doubles, high average and good plate discipline before age 25 boded well
for future power, and after age 25, Palmeiro started hitting homers regularly.
Mo Vaughn on the other hand did not have his first full season in
the majors until age 25, and while he showed good power with 29 homers, he
also struck out 130 times versus 79
walks. Vaughn continued to improve
and put up impressive numbers over the next few years, including an MVP award
in 1995. But Vaughn was never
quite as good as his numbers made him seem. He played for a good hitting
team in a hitter’s park, leading observers to overrate
him. In fact, according to the
win shares system, Vaughn’s best year was in 1996 when he registered
29 win shares. Other than that,
he was never close again. Vaughn
registered only 24 win shares in 1995, the year he won the MVP, not even
in the top five in the league, versus Edgar Martinez’s 32 win
shares. The 25 he registered
in 1998 were his second best ever.
Meanwhile, Palmeiro already had two seasons with over 30 win shares
by 1998, and was better earlier in his career than
Vaughn. Furthermore, Vaughn
never developed plate discipline, averaging 150 strikeouts a year from 1995-98
against about half as many walks, while Raffy’s strikeout and walk totals
remained about even.
Taken as a whole, the numbers in the 1998-99 offseason predicted further
production from Raffy, well into his late 30’s, while maybe a year or
two more good seasons from Vaughn before a dropoff into mediocre
territory. The Anaheim Angels,
however, ignored this information, however, signing Vaughn to a massive six-year
deal worth $80 million. The
Rangers played it smart, and grabbed Raffy from the hands of the inept Baltimore
Orioles at a bargain price of $45 million over 5
years. It didn’t take long
for the two players to go their separate
paths. In 1999, Vaughn registered
only 19 win shares, although injuries limited him to 139
games. But Raffy had a monster year, hitting 47 homers, 148
RBI’s, and a .324 batting average for a total of 31 win
shares. In 2000, Palmeiro continued to produce with 23 win shares
to Vaughn’s 17. Vaughn
missed all of 2001 with a biceps injury, but even if he hadn’t, it is
unlikely he would have matched Raffy’s 25 win shares that
year. Despite his injuries and
declining production, the Mets decided to take Vaughn’s huge contract
in 2002, as they were desperate for
hitting. But even a rich team
with money to spend in need of power should have known better. Vaughn was
very mediocre in 2002, registering 14 win shares, while Raffy continued his
steady production with another 19 win shares.
Writing during the 1998 season, Thomas Boswell recommended that the
Orioles resign Palmeiro instead of going after Vaughn, since he reasoned
that large barrel-chested hitters like Vaughn and Bobby Bonilla tend not
to last into in their late thirties.
That may be true, but it’s hard to
say. What is not in dispute
is that an aging player needs to work out hard and stay in shape, which the
grossly overweight Vaughn did not do in
2002. But even without looking at Vaughn’s body type and
workout habits, it should have been clear that Palmeiro was the better bet
at that point.
The New York Yankees decided to go after Orioles ace righthander Mike
Mussina following the 2001 season.
Mussina was 32 years old, however, but the Yankees nonetheless signed
him to a six-year deal, worth $88.5
million. Was it a good
idea? Mussina had come up at
an early age, and was good right from the
beginning. In 1992, at the age of 23, Mussina posted 24 win shares,
second-best in the AL, and his best season to
date. Mussina continued his steady pitching for the next few
years garnering win shares of 11,18,20,13,19,15,17, and 18 in the years leading
up to his free agency. He was the second-best pitcher in the AL in 1994,
third-best in 1995, and fourth best in
2000. Throughout he was durable,
rarely prone to injury, and his great command led to lots of strikeouts and
few walks. Mussina was a winner: The Yankees were smart to acquire him, even
for a long-term deal. In his first year with Yankees he won 17 games while posting
a measly 3.15 ERA, for 20 win shares, second-best in the
AL. He faltered a bit the next
year with his ERA rising to 4.50, but he still won 18 games while throwing
over 200 innings, for 15 win shares. The Yankees shouldn’t worry too
much in the short term. Mussina
has dropped to 15 win shares before, only to
rebound. He may not throw for
20 win shares again, but he will continue to win for the about next three
seasons. I’d be worried about his production in the last two years of
his deal at ages 36 and 37, however.
The next year the Yankees went after another big free agent, and signed
A’s slugger Jason Giambi to a 7 year, $120 million in the 2001-2002
offseason. Giambi didn’t become a regular until age 25, a little old
for a superstar, and only posted 15 win
shares. But by 1999, at age
28, he was up to 30 win shares, and only got better, posting 38 in 2000 and
2001, taking MVP honors the first year. Throughout his career, Giambi’s
plate discipline improved, as he led the league with walks in both 2000 and
2001, against less than 100 strikeouts. Although Giambi would be 31 in 2002,
the Yankees four-year deal was a fairly safe bet. Despite his late start
at age 25, Giambi’s peak years were huge, and his improved plate discipline
also boded well for the future. In 2002, I would have predicted 30 or more
win shares for the first three years of his deal, 25-30 in the next two years
at ages 34 and 35. But even a hitter as accomplished as Giambi will probably
fade a bit ages 36 and 37, maybe to about 20 win
shares. It thus seems that Giambi
may be somewhat overpaid, but if there is any team that can afford to do
so, it’s the Yankees. Giambi did not disappoint in 2002, pacing the Yankees
with 34 win shares.
The top free agent during the 2002-03 offseason was another slugging
first baseman, Cleveland’ Jim
Thome. Thome was coming of a
career year in which he mashed 52 home runs for a total of 34 win
shares. Thome had been a consistent
producer for the Indians for several years by
2003. He had played fairly well at the big-league level in his
time in the majors at ages 23 and 24, before breaking out at age
25. His win share totals beginning
at that age were 24, 28, 26, 19, 26, 20, and 34 in
2002. If we were to predict
his future performance, we would clearly see that his 34 win shares in 2002
at age 32 was his peak performance, and unlikely to be repeated
again. For a player of his caliber,
I would predict another two or three very good years of 25-28 win shares,
before dipping down in his mid-thirties to about 20 for another couple, followed
by a big decline in his late thirties. I’d say 37 might be the cut-off for a guy like
Thome.
Thome was highly coveted by the Philadelphia Phillies that offseason,
who were trying to build a winner for the move into their new park in
2004. The Phils went out and
offered Thome a hefty six-year deal. The deal is a gamble, and expensive
as well. I’d say the Phils
will get their money’s worth for the first two or three years of the
contract, followed by a year or two of slightly below-expected performance,
before really getting shafted in the last two years when Thome is ages 37
and 38. Rafael Palmeiro might have been productive at those ages,
but he started his major league career at a younger age, and has shown better
plate discipline, not striking out anywhere near as much as Thome.
All-Time Greatest Players: The Later years
And then there is that player who seems to defy all rules about aging
hitters: Barry Bonds. Bonds had his best season ever in 2001, when he was
36 (he turned 37 about halfway through the season). He was almost as good
the next year. How long can Bonds keep this up for? Well, first let’s
chart out the top seasons by older players, until Bonds came along. The best
season at age 36: Babe Ruth with 38 win shares (Bonds had 54). Age 37: Babe
Ruth with 36 (Bonds had 49). Age 38: Ted Williams with 38. Age 39: Williams
with 25. Age 40: Willie Mays with 27. Age 41: Honus Wagner, with 23. Age
42: Wagner with, 17. That’s
some pretty select company. You could certainly make a case that Ruth, Williams,
Mays, and Wagner are the four best players of all
time. There is no doubt that
each was the dominant player in his era, as Bonds has been in his time. Each
was also very good at a very young age, peaking very high, and staying good
late.
Bonds shares all those same traits, except for one. His late career
explosion in 2001 and 2002 is simply unprecedented in baseball history. Bonds
not only had his finest season when he was 36 with 54 win shares, but it
was also the greatest offensive season of all time, and third highest overall
single-season total. In his next campaign, when he was 37, he posted 49 win
shares, two higher than his previous high of 47 when he was 28 years old
(The closest precedent is Honus Wagners’s all-time high of 59 win shares
in 1908 when he was 34. Wagner’s previous high had been 46 at ages 31
and 32. But even that isn’t quite the same, is it?). It’s not clear
why Bonds got better late in his career. Perhaps his improved plate discipline
and increased strength training made the
difference. There have been
allegations of steroid use, but players who used steroids tend to get injured
often, while Bonds has remained healthy for nearly his entire career. Besides,
Bonds workout regimen is so rigorous that his massive bulk could have been
gained naturally.
So how much longer can we expect big seasons from Bonds? Well, he
starts 2003 at age 38, coming off a 49 win share season. If Ted Williams
could hit for 38 win shares at age 38, Bonds certainly can match that, and
probably top it. He can also
probably easily top Williams’ 25 win shares at age 39 and Mays’
27 at age 40. For that matter, I’d bet he could even match Wagner’s
23 at age 41 and 17 at age 42. Why do I think Bonds will be able to do all
this? I would say there are two factors. One is that the sample size for
the all-time greatest players is so small that it makes it difficult to really
know what the upper age limit for great players is. Prior to Bonds, we are
only dealing with about the 4-5 top players of all time. Of those, Babe
Ruth’s hot dog and beer diet didn’t contribute to his longevity
like’s Bonds rigorous training does. Ted Williams was still hitting
well when he retired, and could have continued to play well for a couple
more years, but we’ll never know what he could have done. Bonds and
Mays are essentially the same player, save for Bonds peak years when he was
slightly better, and more importantly, Bonds came along after the advent
of strength training. The new and improved modern conditioning techniques
are probably the real difference between Bonds and his predecessors. His
rigorous training and eating habits might allow him to shatter all of the
above totals for greatest older player, just as he has been doing over the
past two years.
Apparently the Giants
realized all this, and signed him to a five-year $90 million deal in January
2002, with the final year as an option.
He certainly delivered in 2002.
How will Bonds do for the remainder of his contract? I’d be willing
to bet on solid production from him for another three year, if not four years,
providing he maintains the desire to play, and discipline to adhere to his
training program. Bonds is a once in a generation player, the Honus Wagner/Ted
Williams/Willie Mays of our time. Those players don’t come around very
often, and when they do, they can productive much later than any other player.
And besides, there is another benefit with Bonds. Fans will come to the park
just to him, even if he isn’t a great player anymore. He will be chasing
many records in the years to come, and fans will want to see him
try. The Giants took a risk,
but it wasn’t a bad one.
Lesser Stars and Above-Average
Players:
Above-average players
often present difficulties in predicting drop-off
points. They are not going to
be effective quite as late as superstars, but they most likely will produce
past age 32, unlike average players. In May 2000, the Cardinals signed Jim
Edmonds to a six-year $57 million dollar contract, set to begin in 2001.
Edmonds didn’t have his first full season in the majors until age 25,
when he posted 21 win shares for the Angels. He continued to produce at about
the same pace over the next few years, before being traded to St. Louis.
When the Cardinals signed him to his new deal in May 2000, he was 30 years,
and a fine outfielder, but certainly not a great
player. Edmonds contract would from ages 31-36. Based on his prior
record, it seemed like a rather large gamble. But Edmonds settled into a
groove in St. Louis, posting 29 win shares in 2000, and 30 in the first year
of his new deal. He then posted 29 again the following season. Edmonds reached
his peak at age 30, and stayed at the same level at ages 31 and 32. It’s
a little late in a player’s career for his peak, but certainly not
unprecedented. I would not expect 30 win shares from Edmonds again in 2003,
and I would be worried about his production in 2005-06, when he will be 35
and 36 years old. Good as Edmonds may be, he is not a superstar, and he may
cost the Cards in the last two years of his
deal.
In December 1999, the Cleveland Indians signed 37-year old pitcher
Chuck Finley to a three-year $21 million
contract. The Indians wanted
Finley mostly for his reputation as a Yankee-killer; He had a 16-9 career
record against the Bronx Bombers at the
point. The Indians had a huge
regular season in 1999, and although they folded in the playoffs that year,
they believed they were close to beating the
Yanks. But the Indians should
have known better than signing Finley.
In the three years prior, Finley had registered win shares of 11,
17, and 14. If I were predicting Finley’s performance over the next
three years, I would predict one year of about 14 win shares followed by
10 or less the next two years.
Finley turned a good season in 2000, going 16-11 with 15 win
shares. But injuries limited
him to 113 innings and an ERA of 5.54, for a meager 3 win
shares. Finley struggled again
in 2002, before being shipped of to St. Louis for their pennant-run, where
he picked up his game a bit. Not only was the Finley deal a poor one based on his prior
statistics, it locked up money that the Indians needed
elsewhere. Cleveland lost Manny
Ramirez to free agency after the 2000 season, Juan Gonzalez and Roberto Alomar
after 2001, and Jim Thome after 2002.
Cleveland’s glory days are over, thanks in part to lousy
contracts.
A similar situation occurred after the 2002 season, when the Atlanta
Braves decided to part ways with left-handed starter Tom Glavine, who was
also 37 years old at the time. In the three years prior, Glavine posted win
shares of 21, 16, and 18. In
his prime Glavine had been a better pitcher than Finley, registering over
20 win shares 7 times, while Finley only managed that
once. Of some concern was that
after pitching great in the first half of 2002, Glavine fell apart in the
second half. Still his overall
numbers were good, and I would focus on his cumulative stats rather than
his two very different halves. If
I were to predict Glavine’s performance over the next three years, I
would guess he will be around 15-17 for the next two years, before dropping
to about 10-12 in the third year.
The Mets decided to pay him $36 million for three
years. It’s much more than what Finley earned, but its money
better spent. It’s also
less of risk for a rich team like the Mets. You never know what you’re
going to get, but all in all, it’s not a bad gamble for the
Mets. But that’s because
unlike Finley, Glavine is not an above-average player, he is a
superstar.
The same year the Mets signed Mo Vaughn, they acquired Jeromy Burnitz
from the Milwaukee Brewers. Desperate for offense, they liked the fact that
Burnitz had averaged 34 homers and over 100 RBI’s over the past four
years. The Mets should have
been more careful. Burnitz was
33, and for a slightly above-average player, that is dangerous territory,
especially with Burnitz high number of
strikeouts. In his peak years
in Milwaukee before coming to the Mets Burnitz had put up win shares of 19,19,16,
and 18. But as he aged and his
strikeouts remained high, Burnitz did not make any of the adjustments necessary
for an older player.
Furthermore, he struggled trying
to find a batting stance, and ended up with a crazy, swing from his ankles
approach. As a result, his first
year in New York was a disaster.
He barely broke the Mendoza line, with a .215 batting average and
only 19 home runs, and finished with an astonishing 7 win shares! Certainly
I would not have predicted such a large drop-off, but that is the point:
A slightly better than average player nearing his mid-thirties is a
risk. Even if he fixes his swing,
and plays better in 2003 I doubt he will approach even 16 win shares again.
Average
Players:
If above-average players after age 32 are a risk, then the rule on
lesser players is even more obvious: Don’t do
it! Ask yourself, would you
take a 32 year-old outfielder who two years ago batted .236 with 12 homers
before “rebounding” the next year by hitting .266 with 18 homers?
I certainly wouldn’t. But that’s exactly what the Pittsburgh Pirates
did in 2001, signing free agent Derek Bell to a two-year
contract. Predictably, Bell
was terrible, playing in only 46 games and batting .173 before being released
with a year left on his contract. Bell did have one big year, in 1998 when
he produced 22 win shares. But
that was at age 29 with a great lineup to protect him. Three years later,
with two mediocre seasons behind him, the Pirates should have known better.
The irony is that the Pirates are just about the last team that can afford
to make such gaffes.
Unfortunately, the Pirates are not alone. The Orioles made a bone-headed
move with David Segui, signing the oft-injured 32-year old first basemen
to a four year deal in 2001.
Segui’s career high was 16 win shares, and he had reached 15
twice. Is this the kind of player who in his thirties deserves a long term
deal worth $28 million? Not surprisingly, Segui did not deliver. His 14 win
shares in 2001 were more than I expected but hardly worth $7 million a year.
Injuries struck him down for nearly all of 2002, and he was injured again
early in 2003.
An almost identical move was made by the Red Sox before the 1999 season,
following the departure of Mo Vaughn. The Sox signed former Kansas City second
baseman Jose Offerman to a four-year $28 million dollar deal. Offerman had
a career year in 1998, batting .315 and posting 29 win shares. But he had
always been a mediocre player before 1998, never posting more than 18 win
shares in a single season, and he would be thirty years old in 1999. Fooled
by his big year, the Sox bit. His 1999 season was impressive, as he posted
19 win shares, effectively silencing some of his critics. But posted shares
of 9,14, and 4 over the next three years. It was hardly a $28 million
performance.
Diamonds in the
Rough:
A good GM
should not only look at star players, but should also keep his eyes open
for diamonds in the rough, that is underrated players who can be acquired
for cheap. Perhaps the best example of an underrated player who can be acquired
for cheap and really help a team is Matt
Stairs. Matt Stairs doesn’t
really look like a baseball player.
He is listed at 5-9 and 217
pounds. He looks like a rec
league softballer who goes out after a game and pounds
beers. That’s probably
the main reason why he was overlooked for so many years by so many
teams. But the man can
hit. Stairs didn’t even
make the draft, and was signed as a free-agent by the money-conscious
Expos. Despite leading his league
in average in 1991, and playing well in triple-A ball in 1993, the Expos
didn’t give him much of a chance, selling his contract to a Japanese
league team later that year.
Stairs played well in Japan, but they weren’t too impressed with
either, and he signed as a free agent with the Expos again in late
1993. The Expos didn’t
even wait three months before pawning him off to the Red Sox for a nondescript
pitcher. Stairs once again proved
that he could hit in 1994, tearing up the league on Boston’s double-A
team, and doing well at triple-A Pawtucket in
1995. Apparently the Red Sox still weren’t impressed, and
they granted him free agency.
Finally, Stairs was picked up by an organization that did appreciate
him, the Oakland A’s. But
even the A’s made him play in the minors too
long. In 1996, Stairs put up
huge number at Edmonton, before being called up and performing well at the
major league level. 1997 was
to be Stairs first full year in the
Show. He was now 28 years old,
and should have been called up for full-time duty two or three years earlier.
Stairs finally proved he could hang with the big boys, batting .298 with
27 homers in part-time duty. The
next year, now finally playing full time, he knocked in 106 runs while batting
.294. In 1999 he hit 38 home
runs while driving 102 runs. These
performances garnered the A’s win shares of 15,20,20 all for next to
nothing! Stairs numbers went down in 2000, but he was 31 years old. But the
lesson is an important one: Players who don’t look athletic but can
hit in the minors will also hit in the
majors. Furthermore, they can
be acquired at a bargain prices.
Stairs isn’t the only such diamond in the
rough. Troy O’Leary came
up in the Milwaukee Brewers
organization. Despite hitting
well in Triple-A in 1994 as well as with the Brewers in a brief stint later
that year, the Brewers decided not to keep
him. Instead, the Red Sox picked
him, and for next to no money, got the following win share totals from him
in the years beginning in 1995:
12,12,15,14,19,11. That’s
six years of solid major league production from a guy nobody
wanted. It’s especially
galling for a poor organization like the Brewers to lose that kind of production
to wealthy team.
The Cleveland Indians lost out on a productive player in Dave Roberts.
Roberts played well in Triple-A ball in 1999, 2000, and 2001, but despite
this, the Indians didn’t give him a chance to play full time. They finally
traded him to the Dodgers and he responded immediately, stealing 45 bases
and posting 19 win shares in 2002. But he was already 29 years old, and should
have been playing at the big league level several years earlier. The Dodgers
nearly missed out on another such an opportunity with Paul Lo Duca. Lo Duca
was a catcher in the Dodgers organization, but as long as Mike Piazza was
around, he wasn’t likely to see much playing time. But Piazza was traded
in 1998, which should have cleared a space for Lo Duca in 1999. He had a
huge year in triple-A ball the year before, and was clearly ready for the
big leagues. But the Dodgers decided to trade for Todd Hundley instead. Hundley
put up rather mediocre numbers in 1999 and 2000, while Lo Duca tore up the
minors yet again. Then in 2001, the 29-year old Lo Duca finally got his chance.
He made the most of it, batting .320 with 25 homers, for a cool 28 win shares.
He was good again in 2002, posting 19 win shares. But he should have been
the full-time catcher two years earlier.
Kevin Young was another such diamond in the rough, who finally hit
well when he got the chance with the Pirates, although they ended up keeping
him for too long. Like other
players, he reached 32 or 33 he was a big gamble. As for current players,
I would bet Jeremy Giambi will produce well for the Red Sox, who acquired
him at a low price, and Erubial Durazo, finally given a full-time chance
to play in the majors, will hit well in Oakland.
The Coors Field
Effect:
So different is the baseball played at Coors Field in Denver that
I have devoted a special section to it.
Coors field is the greatest hitter’s park of all
time. The gaudy numbers hitters
put up at Coors tends to make both hitters and pitchers true value harder
to gauge. The thin air at Coors
allows the ball to travel 10 percent farther than at sea level, while at
the same time making curveballs harder to throw. All this makes it hard to
judge a good player at Coors.
One of the first victims of Coors Field was curveballer named Darryl
Kile. Kile was a bit erratic in his early years with the Houston Astros,
but blossomed in 1997 with a 19-7 record and a 2.57
ERA. The Rockies, forever in
need of quality pitching, signed him to a three-year
deal. The next year Kile led
the league in losses with 17, and posted a 5.20 ERA. He was even worse the
next year, with a 6.61 ERA. The
Rockies mercifully traded him to St. Louis, and in 2000 he was back to normal,
winning 20 games with a 3.91 ERA. He was even better in 2001, posting a scant
3.09 ERA. Kile was still pitching well at the time of his tragic death halfway
through the 2002 season.
Rockies management decided that curveballers were not going to be
effective at Coors, and settled on a sinkerball pitcher, Mike Hampton, with
the hope that the groundballs Hampton would induce could get the job done
at Coors. So in December 2000,
the Rockies went out and made Hampton the highest paid pitcher in history
at eight years $121 million.
Hampton was a star pitcher, and at only 28 years old, still in his
prime. In 1999 he was the
second-best pitcher in the NL with an impressive 24 win shares, and the next
year he was the fifth-best pitcher in the NL with
18. If you’re going to
pay that kind of money, Hampton is the kind of guy you’re going to spend
it on right?
Well, as long as your team doesn’t play in Colorado. Hampton
was effective the first half of 2001 but ended up with a 5.41 ERA and only
11 win shares. He was even worse
in 2002, with only 5 win shares.
Like Kile, the Rockies decided to trade
Hampton. But would there be
any takers? The Atlanta Braves, ever mindful of pitching, decided to take
Hampton, but only after forcing the Rockies to pay a large share of his remaining
contract. Was the Braves gamble
a good one? Certainly, it
was. Until 1999, Hampton was
a solid pitcher. For the two years after that, he was on of baseball’s
best. 28 year-pitchers don’t
decline that quickly, and whatever effect Coors had on him will most likely
be gone soon, just as it was for Darryl Kile. I don’t think Hampton
will ever post 24 win shares like he did in 1999, but the high teens are
certainly within reach.
Whereas the Hampton deal was a reasonable gamble for the pitching-poor
Rockies, another pitcher they signed that same year was not: Denny
Neagle. Neagle had been a fairly
good pitcher in his prime, peaking at 21 win shares in 1997. But his career
was on the downside, as he posted poor seasons in 1999 and 2000. Yet the
Rockies went out and paid him a huge amount, five years $51
million. Signing a washed-up
32 year-old pitcher is not a good idea, unless you can acquire him for cheap
and hope he will surprise you. The
only people Neagle surprised were the Rockies, with a 5.38 ERA in 2001, and
only 8 win shares in 2002. Neagle then declared he wanted to somewhere where
he was appreciated, but not
surprisingly, there were no
takers.
Just as Coors Field skews pitching statistics, it skews hitting
statistics, leading some teams to overrate Colorado’s
hitters. Perhaps the most
conspicuous example of this came when none other than the cash-strapped Brewers
went out and spent $21 million on free-agent Jeffrey Hammonds in December
2000. Hammonds had put up huge
numbers that year batting .335 and knocking in 106
runs. There were two reasons
the Brewers should have been skeptical of
Hammonds. One is the Coors Field
effect: Hammonds giant numbers only translate to 14 win shares, certainly
not worth $7 million a year. But
second, Hammonds had been injured throughout his career, never playing in
more than 123 games in a single year! He was also thirty years
old. If I were to predict his
performance over the next three years, I would guess he’d be injured
for about half on the season for his first two years, putting up mediocre
numbers, before collapsing into horrid numbers his third
year.
In his first year with the Brewers, Hammonds didn’t even play
half the season. In just 49 games in 2001, he put up poor
numbers. He then sent a new
personal record for games in 2002 with a whopping 128, while putting meager
numbers that earned him nine win shares. And in 2003? I’d guess he
won’t even top nine win shares.
The irony of this is that the Brewers are just about that last team
that can afford to sign such poor
contracts. And yet they should
have known what to expect based on Hammonds past
performance. The rule for Coors
Field players is simple: Beware of hitters, and keep your eyes open for
undervalued pitchers.
So, how can we value future free agents? Let’s take a look at
some guys who will become free agents soon, and see how much they’re
going to be worth. 1999 Rookie
of the Year Carlos Beltran plays for the cash-strapped
Royals. It’s unlikely they
will be able to resign him, and some teams have already thought about trading
for him during the 2003 season. At
the tender age of 22, Beltran showed early promise, garnering 18 win shares
to win the ROY award in 1999. Injuries limited him the next year, but he
was back in 2001, posting an impressive 27 win shares. He had 21 win shares
the following season, along with 29 homers, a personal high. Beltran has
the potential to be a great player. His home run and walk totals have increased
every year, showing the increased strength and discipline we expect from
a player as he reaches hid mid-twenties.
He also has speed and is a good outfielder. He still strikes out too
much, and his average slipped a bit in 2002, but Beltran very well could
emerge into a superstar. Playing
for a fairly good hitting Royals team, I believe Beltran will shatter his
previous high of 27 win shares this
year. If he does, he will be
a 27-year old free agent at the end of the year with a good track record.
I would not hesitate to sign him up for six or seven years at $15 million
a year. If Beltran falters this
year, which I think is unlikely, or if he shows little improvement, staying
at around 20 win shares, I would still be willing to sign him for five years
at around $10 a year: Beltran is a rare five-tool player, the kind of guy
who doesn’t come along very often.
Another big-name free agent on a poor team is 2002 MVP Miguel
Tejada. The Oakland A’s
have already said they won’t even try to resign him, leaving other teams
drooling at the prospect of acquiring him. Is it a good idea? Tejada had
23 win shares in 2000, 25 in 2001, and 32 in his MVP season of 2002. It’s
been a steady progression, and he is only 27 years
old. But 2002 was the first
time Tejada batted over .300, and his plate discipline remains
poor. I’d day a lot of
his future value will determined by how he bats this year. Another 30 or
more win share with a high batting average, and it will be clear that he
is a first-tier star. But a
slide back to 25 win shares with a low batting average and few walks will
be 2002 was his peak season, and I would value his future worth much less.
Perhaps the best young free-agent pitcher this year will be Kevin
Millwood. Millwood pitched well as a 23-year old in 1998, before breaking
out with a huge 1999 season gaining 22 win shares, third best in NL. But
Millwood faltered badly in 2000 and 2001, before coming back together in
early 2002 and finishing with 19 win shares. Millwood is only 28 years, and
it is not uncommon for young pitchers to go through tough seasons early in
their careers. I’d bet
Millwood will good again this year for the Phillies, and if he is, he will
certainly be worth signing to a lucrative four or five year
deal.
The real prize of this offseason, however, will be Montreal rightfielder
Vladimir Guerrero. Guerrero will only be 28 years old next year, and has
been an established star for several years. After tearing up the minor leagues,
Vlad came to the majors in 1997 at the tender age of 21, and posted good
numbers right away. He blossomed into a full-fledged star the next year,
with 29 win shares. He posted nearly identical seasons in the years that
followed, with 28, 29, 23, and 29 win shares. He hits for power and average,
steals bases, and shows fairly good, if not great, plate discipline. He also
has a cannon for an arm, and often overthrows his target. The only real knock
on him is that he hasn’t improved as he has aged, as one might expect.
But he is still young enough where his stats could get better.
Although we haven’t seen what his 2003 season will be like, I
would not hesitate to sign him at the end of the year, regardless of his
performance this year. At worst, he will post about 29-30 win shares for
the next five or six years, before leveling off a bit for another two or
three years. At best, he may develop further, and post win share totals in
the mid-thirties. I would be
willing to offer him a contract similar to Manny Ramirez’s: eight years,
$140 million. He is not quite
worth Alex Rodriguez years (ten) or money ($25 million a year). I believe
that Vlad’s best days are still ahead of him, and teams should eagerly
try to acquire him.
